GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
THE TRIAL COURT DIVESTED ITSELF OF ANY COMPETENT JURISDICTION TO PROCEED BY DIRECTLY AND/OR INDIRECTLY INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY BY VEHICLE OF OUT OF COURT COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE JURORS WOODARD, BULLIS, AND ELLIS WITH PURPOSE TO MANIPULATE THE JURY PANEL INTO A GUILT PRONE STATUS, DEPRIVING PETITIONER AND THE PUBLIC OF A PUBLIC TRIAL, THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO BE PRESENT AND PARTICIPATE IN HIS OWN DEFENSE AS WELL AS CONFLICT INTEREST FREE COUNSEL, AND IN VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS PROTECTED AND GUARANTEED BY THE STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WITHOUT ANY VALID WAIVER.
The trial judge along with the direct and/or indirect assistance of the prosecutor and defense attorney participated in collective unlawful and unconstitutional conduct to manipulate the though process of the jury into bias in support of the State’s case, inter alia, as evidenced by the following:
(1) Juror Joan Woodard Badge #6541, who subsequently became the jury foreman, informed the Court at the beginning of voir dire that she was currently being prosecuted for a “DUI” and that she could not be on the jury because she was scheduled for a court ordered program in a couple days; to which the trial judge responded that he would have that taken care of and would have the bailiff assist her in resolving the “DUI” requirement; thereby inducing judicial favoritism form the jury foreman through favorable judicial treatment.
(2) As clearly and conclusively evidenced by Addendum (A), during voir dire juror Joan Ellis Bage #6193, expressed actual bias against Defendant-Petitioner, which would have been grounds for reveral of any subsequent conviction, cf., State v. Irby, 187 Wn.App. 183, 347 P.3d 1103 (2015):
Case Summary, in an aggravated murder case, there was manifest error that required reversal of all conviction because Juror #38 demonstrated actual bias under RCW 4.44.170 (2) when she stated during voir dire that she would like to say that he’s guilty. The presence of a biased juror in a criminal trial cannot be harmless. Such error requires a new trial without a showing of prejudice.
However, in attempt to correct the trial attorneys failure to request dismissal for cause of Jury Ellis, based on actual bias and inconsistent with basis for other jurors to be dismissed for cause, and the Court’s previous duty to dismiss Juror Ellis for cause, the judicial participants fraudulently had an out of court hearing without Defendant’s presence, with a juror who claimed Juror Ellis has expressed concern that the Defendant would know her address, culminating in the trail Court judge improperly invading the juror province and dismissing said Juror Ellis without juror Ellis stating that she could not set such fears aside and decide the case solely on the evidence, see Addendum (B), all without objection from defense attorney evidencing participation by defense attorney by not requesting a new jury be impaneled because Juror Ellis had contaminated other jurors; creating a situation where if dismissal of Juror Ellis was warranted, then dismissal of the other jurors subject to the same was also mandated.
(3) Apparently the judicial participants in this case determined that Juror Lottie Bullis Badge #6111 would be a fair and impartial juror, contrary to said judicial participants desire to impanel a guilt prone jury but the trail judge knew no valid basis was present for Juror Bullis dismissal, so the trail judge perpetrated a fraud upon the record by stating that is there was not objections to the trail judge dismissing Juror Ellis for cause, he would do so, however, if anyone objected the trial judge would leave Juror Ellis on the jury, knowing that if Defendant-Petitioner had not been deprived of his right to be present and participate in his own defense, Defendant-Petitioner would surely have objected preventing the unlawful and unconstitutional dismissal for cause of Juror Bullis, see Addendum (C ) , all of which improperly invaded and faulted the thought process of Juror Bullis and was in violation of Defendant-Petitioner’s procedural and substantive constitutional rights and the statutory laws of the State of Washington.
The forgoing evidences: Denial of Petitioner’s and public’s right to a public trial; denial of right to be present; denial of right to participate on one’s own defense; denial of lawfully impaneled jury; denial of conflict interest free trial counsel, see Addendum (D) and (E) and State v. Foreman, 2018 Wash.App. Lexis 375 (2018) (“In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), complete denial of counsel includes the following scenarios: (1) where a defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial; (2) Where counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecutions case to meaningful adversarial testing; (3) Where the circumstances are such that the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance of counsel is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trail; (4) When counsel labors under and actual conflict of interest”)